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JOHNNY BLASTOFF, INC. V. LOS ANGELES
RAMS FOOTBALL COMPANY, ST. LOUIS RAMS
PARTNERSHIP, NFL PROPERTIES, INC.
188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1999)
INTRODUCTION

Johnny Blastoff, Inc. ("Blastoff'), filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
seeking a declaratory judgment against the Los Angeles Rams
Football Company, the National Football League ("NFL"), and the
St. Louis Rams partnership. 1 Specifically, Blastoff alleged that the
Rams had engaged in unfair competition, including
misrepresenting the registration status of the "St. Louis Rams"
mark.2 Blastoff also contended that it did not infringe on defendant
NFL's trademark rights.3 On September 5, 1997, Blastoff filed an
amended complaint in which it sought $100 million in damages as
well as declarations of unfair competition trademark infringement,
and cancellation of the Rams' registered trademark for the "Rams"
mark.4
On March 12, 1998, the trial judge granted the NFL's motion for
summary judgment that sought to dismiss the first amended
complaint.5 The judge also granted the NFL's counterclaim for
injunctive relief and ordered the State of Wisconsin to cancel
Blastoffs registration of the mark "St. Louis Rams." Blastoff
appealed this decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision.6

1 Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Co., 188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir.

1999).
2 Id.
3 Id.

4 Id
5 Id.
6 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 428.
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BACKGROUND

The Blastoff Corporation was organized under the laws of
Wisconsin in 1993. Rodney Rigsby ("Rigsby") is president,
chairman of the board, and primary shareholder of Blastoff.8 The
corporation, which is in the business of creating and marketing
cartoon characters, is named for "Johnny Blastoff', a fictional,
animated cartoon character conceived by Rigsby.9 Rigsby has
developed several other characters in conjunction with the Johnny
Blastoff cartoon concept.1 ° "Blastoff' cartoon story lines are set in
fictional "Tower City" which is home to a number of fictional
sports teams including the "Tower City Rams."11 Rigsby designed
logos for each of the fictional teams. 2
The NFL is an unincorporated association of member clubs,
which field professional football teams. 3 The member clubs
derive substantial income from admission fees and personal seat
licenses, national television and radio broadcast rights, and the
sales of jerseys, jackets, and other sports merchandise and
memorabilia. 4 Each member club has adopted a team name, as
well as symbols, logos, colors and other identifying marks. 5 Each
club's marks have been assigned to the defendant NFL Properties,
which licenses other entities to use the marks in merchandising and
promotional activities. 6
The Rams football team, which is one of the NFL's oldest
member clubs, was founded in 1937 as the Cleveland Rams
Franchise and moved to Los Angeles in 1946.17 Beginning in
December of 1993 and throughout 1994, newspaper articles in the
7 Id.
8 Id. at 429.

9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 429.
12Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 429.
17 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 430.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/11
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St. Louis area reported the possibility that the Los Angeles Rams
would move to St. Louis.18 On January 17, 1995, a press
conference was organized in St. Louis by Georgia Frontiere, owner
of the Los Angeles Rams club, and St. Louis Mayor Freeman
Bosley.' 9 At that press conference, it was announced that the Rams
club intended to relocate to St. Louis.20 Local and national media,
including sports writers who filed reports for USA Today, the New
York Times, as well as other national media outlets covered the
press conference.2 In the New York Times article, Mayor Bosley
stated, "The St. Louis Rams - how sweet it is." The January 18,
1995, edition of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch included a sixteenpage pullout section devoted to the Rams, the front page of which
bore the title "St. Louis Rams." 2'
In April of 1995, vendors began using the "St. Louis Rams"
mark through various mediums.23 For example, immediately after
the final vote to move the Rams from Los Angeles to St. Louis on
April 12, 1999, LogoAthletic, a licensee of NFL Properties,
shipped officially licensed apparel bearing the "St. Louis Rams"
mark to the St. Louis area.24 On April 26, 1995, NFL Properties
filed two trademark applications on behalf of the Rams for the
mark "St. Louis Rams."2 5
On February 22, 1995, while the NFL was in the process of
approving the Rams' relocation from Los Angeles to St. Louis,
Blastoff filed a trademark application for the mark "St. Louis
Rams" with the state of Wisconsin.26 Blastoff received a
registration certificate the same day.27 At the time of the filing,
Blastoff claimed that it was unaware of any other entity using the

18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 430.
23 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 431.

24 Id.
25 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 432.

26 Id.
27 Id.
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mark "St. Louis Rams." 2 On March 10, 1995, Blastoff filed two
federal intent-to-use trademark applications for the mark "St. Louis
Rams," accompanied by a ram's head design.29 In his applications,
Blastoff stated it was unaware of any other party's right to use the
mark in commerce."
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
published Blastoffs trademark applications. 31 The Defendants
made a number of attempts to protect their "St. Louis Rams" NFL
football club mark. The first of which was a timely notice of
opposition to the trademark with the PTO.32 The PTO responded
by suspending all action on each of the Plaintiffs 33and the
Defendants' applications pending the outcome of this suit.
On March 12, 1998, the defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that: (1) the St. Louis Rams had acquired rights
in the mark "St. Louis Rams" prior to Blastoff; (2) Blastoff's
alleged rights in the mark were based on false and fraudulent
claims; (3) Blastoffs marks were likely to be confused with the
Ram's marks; (4) Blastoffs marks diluted the distinctive value of
the Rams' trademarks; (5) Blastoff lacked standing to bring unfair
competition and false advertising claims, and such claims were
without merit; (6) the "Rams" mark is not generic; and (7) the
Rams' application to the PTO was based on bona fide use of the
"Rams" mark in commerce.34 On June 24, 1998, the district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment ruling, inter
alia, that: (1) the NFL did not infringe on Blastoffs "St. Louis
Rams" mark under Wisconsin law; (2) Blastoff infringed the
NFL's trademark rights; (3) the NFL did not engage in unfair
competition; (4) the Rams' federally registered "Rams" mark is not
generic; and (5) Blastoff is not entitled to money damages.35

28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 432.
31 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 433.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 434.
34 Id.
35 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 435.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

ISSUES
On appeal, the issues the 7'"Circuit considered regarding the
alleged trademark infringement were: (1) whether the district court
erred in concluding that the NFL defendants had acquired
protectable rights in the mark "St. Louis Rams" prior to Blastoff;
(2) whether the district court erred in finding a likelihood of
confusion exists between the Plaintiff's and the Defendant's use of
the "St. Louis Rams" mark; (3) whether the district court's ruling
that Blastoff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in
support of its claim that the "Rams" mark was generic was proper;
and (4) whether the district court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff's
unfair competition and deceptive advertising claims due to the
plaintiffs lack of standing. 6
DISCUSSION
The seventh circuit reviewed the district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo based on the ruling in Green v.
Shalala.7 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.3" The court viewed the record and all
reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. 9
PriorProtectableRights
The Plaintiff contended that the district court erred in concluding
that the Defendants had acquired protectable rights in the mark "St.

36 Id. at 436.
37 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 436, citing Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 99 (7th Cir.
1995).
38 Id.
39 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 436, citing Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 12 F.3d 92, 95 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Louis Rams" prior to Blastoff.40 In response, the Defendants argue
that they established prior and superior rights in the "St. Louis
Rams" mark through the public use of the mark, third-party
promotion and advertising, and the fact that the public associated
the mark with the Rams NFL franchise.4 1 The trial court, reflecting
the Defendant's view, stated that "by the time the plaintiff filed its
Wisconsin registration in February 1995, a substantial portion of
the public associated the mark 'St. Louis Rams' with the
defendant's football club. 42
The current case law in the area of franchise relocation and
expansion has created a strong presumption of priority ownership
in a franchise's marks.43
In Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v.
MetropolitanBaltimore Football Club Ltd., the court held that the
"Indianapolis Colts" mark might be viewed simply as "Colts," an
independent urban affiliation.' While courts consistently define
"use" as the public sale of a product, in some circumstances parties
have been found to possess rights in an alteration of an existing
mark that was used solely by third parties to designate its product.45
On January 17, 1995, Georgia Frontiere, the owner of the Rams,
and St. Louis Mayor Freeman Bosley held a press conference in
which they publicly announced the Rams' intention to relocate
from Los Angeles to St. Louis. This press conference received
local and national media attention, and began an onslaught of
nationwide merchandising and season tickets sales. By the time
Blastoff registered the "St. Louis Rams" mark in Wisconsin in
February of 1995, a significant portion of the public associated the
mark with the Rams Football Club.46 However, Blastoff asserted
that the Defendants had not sufficiently used the mark to be given

40 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 439.
41 Id. at 437.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 438.
44 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 438, citing Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Baltimore Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1994).

45 Id., citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (D.Pa. 1942)
("Coke" protectable trademark for "Coca-Cola").
46 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 439.
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priority.47 Blastoff argued: (1) that at the January press conference,
none of the Defendants used the words "St. Louis Rams," and thus,
the term was rendered an "unarticulated idea for a team name,"
which is not protectable; (2) that newspaper and media coverage is
insufficient to establish priority; and (3) that the football team
"operated publicly and exclusively as the 'LA Rams." 4
The court looked to the ruling in National Cable Television
Assoc. v. Am. Cinema Editors,Inc. for guidance on this issue.."
The court held that Blastoff failed to demonstrate any equivalent
use of the mark "St. Louis Rams" by February of 1995, when the
Defendants established, by use and public association, their
priority in the mark.50 Georgia Frontiere's announcement at the
press conference detailing the franchise' move from Los Angeles
to St. Louis, implicitly adopted the exact phrase "St. Louis Rams"
on the date of her press conference. The Seventh Circuit's decision
in IndianapolisColts is strong support for the proposition that the
Rams organization and the NFL had a long-established priority
over the use of the "Rams" name in connection with the same
professional football team, regardless of urban affiliation.5"
Similar to this case, the court in IndianapolisColts held that the
team's move from Baltimore to Indianapolis neither broke the
continuity of the team in its different location due to the fact that it
was the same team a different home base, nor entitled a third party
to pick up the name and use it to confuse Colts fans. 2 Because a
product or organization may be designated by more than one
trademark, it is irrelevant, as Blastoff suggested, that the official
name of the Rams remained "Los Angeles Rams" until April of
1995."3 Thus, the seventh circuit court agreed with the district

47 Id.
48 Id.
49 937 F.2d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1991) (abbreviations and nicknames of
trademarks or names used only by the public give rise to protectable rights in
the owners of the trade name or mark which the public modified).
50 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 439.
51Id. at 441.
52 Id. at 442.
53 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 442.
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court's determination that the Defendant-Appellees had acquired
protectable rights in the "St. Louis Rams" mark prior to Blastoff. 4
Likelihood of Confusion
The Plaintiff further contended that the district court erred in
finding that a likelihood of confusion existed between Blastoff s
and the Defendant's use of the "St. Louis Rams" mark." Blastoff
challenged the district court's determination that Blastoff is not
entitled to a declaration that it did not infiinge on the Rams'
56
mark.
The "keystone" of trademark infringement is "likelihood of
confusion" as to source, affiliation, connection or sponsorship of
goods or services among the relevant class of customers and
potential consumers.57 Usually, the confusion alleged is "forward
confusion," which occurs "when customers mistakenly think that
the junior user's goods or services are from the same source or are
connected with the senior user's goods or services." s8 In such a
case, the junior user attempts to capitalize on the senior user's
good will and established reputation by suggesting that his product
come from the same source as does the senior user's product.5 9 In
this case, however, Blastoff did not rely on the class forward
confusion, but rather on the doctrine of "reverse confusion."'
Reverse confusion occurs when a large junior user saturates the
market with a trademark similar to that of a smaller, senior user.6'
Nonetheless, the senior user is uninjured because the public comes
to assume that the senior user's products are really the junior user's
or that the former has become somehow connected to the latter.62
54 Id. at 443.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 446.
58 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 446-447.
59 Id. at 447, citing Big 0 Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561

F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
60 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 447.
61 Id.
62 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/11

8

Ricketts: Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Company, St. L

1999]

JOHNNY BLASTOFF, INC.

217

The result is that the senior user loses the value of the trademark it's product identity, corporate identity, control over its goodwill
and reputation, and ability to move into new markets.6'
Blastoff alleged that the Defendants were the cause of reverse
confusion. 64 He argued that the NFL was using its seemingly
limitless resources to saturate the market with a trademark similar
to their own. 6' The court found that Blastoffs argument fell short
because Blastoff was not a senior user and therefore had no
protectable rights to the "St. Louis Rams" mark.66 Blastoffs own
statement, that the public associated the Plaintiff's apparel with the
St. Louis Rams Football Club, led the appellate court to affirm the
holding that a likelihood of confusion of the parties' marks did
67
exist.
GenericMarks
Blastoff also argued that the district court erroneously ruled that
it failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in support of its
claim that the "Rams" mark was generic.68 Specifically, Blastoff
claimed that because the Colorado State Rams college football
team uses the team name "Rams," the mark has become generic
and the Defendants have therefore lost their rights in the mark.69 In
making this claim, Blastoff relied on 15 U.S.C. Section 1064(3),
which provides that a federal trademark registration that has been
on the registry for more than five years can be canceled in
circumstances where the mark has become "the generic name for
the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is
registered."7' A term may be considered generic if it "is one that is
63 Id. at 447-448, citing Ameritech Inc. v. American Information
Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987); also Big 0 Tire Dealers,
561 F.2d at 1372.
64 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 448.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 451.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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commonly used to name or designate a kind of goods,"71 or it
represents the common linguistic usage for such goods.72
The Defendants' registration application specifies that the
"Rams" name is to be used for "entertainment services - namely,
professional football exhibitions."' Thus, the product denoted by
the "Rams" registration is a professional football team.7 4 While
"Rams" is associated with a college football team, the record is
devoid of any evidence demonstrating that any other professional
football team is known as the "Rams."75
According to the court, Blastoff also failed to adduce any
evidence that the "Rams" mark has become a common term for
professional football teams generally.76 Contrary to the plaintiffs
claim, use of the "Rams" mark by one, or even several, college
athletic teams does not establish a genuine issue as to the mark
having become generic as defined by the statute because none of
the college teams using the mark produces the same professional
football team product.77
Unfair Competition andDeceptive Advertising
Blastoff also contended that the district court erred in dismissing
its unfair competition and deceptive advertising claims due to the
Plaintiffs lack of standing.78 Specifically, Blastoff argued that in
seeking to prevent him from using the "St. Louis Rams" mark, the
Defendants marketed football paraphernalia with notices attached
which stated that the "Rams" mark was registered with the PTO,
which amounted to deceptive advertising.79
71 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 451, citing Mil-Mar Shoe Co. v. Shonac Corp., 75
F.3d 1153, 1157 (7th Cir. 1996).
72 Blastoff, 188 F.3d 't 451, citing Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 699

F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1983).
73 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 452.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 452, citing Henri's Food Products Co. v. Tasty
Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d 1303, 1305 (7th Cir. 1987).
77 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 452.
78 Id. at 453.
79 Id.
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In determining that Blastoff lacked standing, the district court
ruled that under Section 43(a) of thd Lanham Act,"0 a party must
demonstrate that it "has a reasonable interest to be protected
against conduct violating the Act."81
In consideration of prior protectable rights, the court determined
that the NFL has established superior rights to the "St. Louis
Rams" mark.82 As such, under the common law, Blastoff, which
had never been part of the NFL, in any manner, is precluded from
using the "St. Louis Rams" mark, and Blastoff therefore does not
have a reasonable interest in a right to be protected by bringing
suit.8" Therefore, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court's determination that Blastoff lacked standing to bring suit
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 4
CONCLUSION

The court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling. The appellate court held that the defendants did
acquire protectable rights in the mark "St. Louis Rams" prior to
Blastoff. Furthermore, the court found that no likelihood of
confusion existed between the two parties because the plaintiff was
not a senior user of the mark, and therefore had no protectable
rights. Finally, the Appellate court found that the "St. Louis
Rams" mark is not generic, and the plaintiff lacked standing to
bring an unfair competition and deceptive advertising claim.
Whitney Ricketts

80 15 U.S.C. §1125 (governs unfair competition and false advertising

claims).
81 Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 454.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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